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Descartes is well known for what he says about our situation in the world as pure thinkers 
and knowers. The Cartesian meditator seeks knowledge of the nature and existence of 
himself and the world around him. But Descartes is also deeply concerned with our situation 
in the world as agents, with the questions of what our free will consists in, how we should 
use it, how we can live virtuous and happy lives, and how the physical, emotional, and 
intellectual aspects of ourselves affect what we should desire and how we pursue those 
things. In the Discourse on Method he announces that “it was always my most earnest 
desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false in order to see clearly into my own 
actions and proceed with confidence in this life” (Pt. I: CSM I 115; AT VI 10). Throughout 
his published work, from the Discourse on Method, to the Meditations, to The Passions of 
the Soul, as well as in his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, Descartes offers both a 
theoretical framework and practical advice regarding our situation as embodies moral 
agents, acting in situations of uncertainty, and influenced by a wide array of emotions, 
appetites, and confused perceptions in our pursuit of the good. Questions about the nature of 
freedom, the power and scope of the will, and the relationship between the will and the 
bodily passions are not purely abstract, metaphysical questions. They have practical and 
moral significance for the possibility of achieving virtue, happiness, and even salvation. In 
this issue, I am excited to be able to bring together six essays focusing on the virtue and 
freedom of the Cartesian agent. 
 
Kimberly Blessing, in “What’s Done Is Done: Descartes on Resoluteness and Regret,” 
focuses on the role of resolution in Descartes’s moral philosophy. She pulls together 
relevant texts from the Discourse on Method, The Passions of the Soul, and the 
correspondence with Princess Elisabeth in order to make sense of Descartes’s 




counterintuitive assertion that that we can avoid all regret and repentance just by being 
resolute, regardless of the outcomes of the choices we resolutely make. Descartes’s 
assertion becomes less puzzling as Blessing fits it into the context of Descartes’s theory of 
virtue with its emphasis on rationality and self-reliance. Blessing explains that Cartesian 
resoluteness is a matter of making proper use our free will to act on our best judgments and 
avoid being diverted by the passions. In the tradition of the Stoics, and anticipating Kant, 
Descartes understands both virtue and happiness to depend on the proper use of free will 
because our free will is within our control. If we can use our free will well, then we have 
acted virtuously and have no cause for regret.   
 
In my own essay, “Descartes and the Danger of Irresolution,” I pursue a closely related 
question: why should irresolution, a seemingly minor character flaw characterized by 
uncertainty and indecisiveness, be such a bugbear for the champion of the Method of 
Doubt? Descartes’s approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or 
what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical 
judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which 
Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of 
making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and 
uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be not only the source of 
remorse and repentance, but also of vice and of a weak soul. In order to explain its 
dangerousness, I offer an analysis of irresolution as a failure of the will to determine itself to 
follow a judgment in the face of ignorance or uncertainty. This analysis allows me to 
connect irresolution to weakness of will and to explain why Descartes regards resolution as 
an essential component of virtue.  
 
In “Descartes's Virtue Theory” Andrew Youpa also takes up the topic of virtue and 
resolution, connecting it to freedom of the will. Youpa maintains that Cartesian virtue is a 
resolution to focus the attention on what reason deems worthy of consideration. Central to 
Youpa’s interpretation is his account of motivation. He identifies three sources of 
motivation: intellectual clarity, the passions, and the will itself. Youpa argues that although 
the will is constrained by its orientation toward truth and goodness, it has some power to 
determine what the intellect is applied to. The will is itself a source of motivation in so far 
as it is able to accept or reject what is confusedly understood, and, importantly, insofar as it 
is able to govern attention. It is the will’s ability to govern attention that Youpa regards as 
the key to understanding resolution. Youpa argues that resolution, the essential element of 
Cartesian virtue, should be understood as higher-order motivational disposition to direct our 
attention toward clear perceptions and firm and determinate judgments about the good, 




thereby safeguarding the will’s freedom against the occasionally harmful influence of the 
passions. 
 
Thomas Lennon, in “Descartes and Pelagianism,” gives a detailed account of the grounds on 
which Descartes was accused of endorsing the heresy, known as Pelagianism, that humans 
can achieve salvation without the grace of God. Lennon shows how the question of 
Descartes’s position on this theological doctrine depends heavily on Descartes’s conception 
of freedom, and the whether it is essentially similar to God’s freedom. The central worry 
arises from Descartes’s apparent libertarianism—if our will is entirely free to pursue the 
good and the true, as Descartes seems to claim, then it would appear that we are capable of 
making the choices that will bring about our salvation without help from God. Lennon 
argues that the accusation of Pelagianism rests on a mistaken interpretation of Cartesian 
freedom as consisting in a type of indifference of the will reserved only for God, 
indifference that results from being entirely unconstrained. Human indifference, he argues, 
is always constrained by passions, imagination, or perception, and thus differs from the 
libertarian indifference that supports Pelagianism. 
 
In “Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will” Brian Collins 
challenges the libertarian interpretation of Descartes, also looking at the analogy between 
freedom in humans and freedom in God, and also considering the extent to which human 
choices must depend on God. Collins argues that freedom can be regarded as non-univocal 
between God and humans, in a fashion similar to the way that Descartes regards substance 
as non-univocal between God and humans. Although God’s will is free because it is 
completely undetermined, Collins proposes that human will may be free in a non-univocal 
sense that permits the human will to be determined by God, not directly, but by way of 
perceptions of the true and the good, which are freely created by God. Collins takes this 
analogy to provide support for both theological and intellectual compatibilism. 
 
Finally, in  “Descartes on Degrees of Freedom: A Close Look at a Key Text” C. P. Ragland 
weighs in on the topic of freedom and indifference. Ragland offers a close analysis of 
Descartes’s 9 February 1645 letter (supposedly) to Mesland, revisiting Anthony Kenny’s 
distinction between “liberty of spontaneity” and “liberty of perversity.” In a careful reading 
of the letter, Ragland offers an alternative interpretation of liberty of spontaneity and liberty 
of perversity, defending the coherence of Descartes’s account of freedom and arguing that it 
is consistent with his account of degrees of freedom. 
 
 
